Oh. Yeah; I’m not so into Arendt. Can’t say I’ve read her much though. But what i have. I has always sounded very “one sided” philosophically.
I thought you were saying something like that freedom is the removal of the idea that courage involves what one chooses so far as not being liked. Like the risk of not being liked is itself a move of creating discord which is itself based in a false ideal of what freedom is.
For once we step out of the causal regression of agency, then I am merely doing Becuase my actions are aligned with what is good. How ever it appears.
I think you’ve understood the original post, though I’m a bit unclear the meaning of your third paragraph. To clarify: my original post is a comment on Kishima & Koga’s Adlerian self-help book. If you haven’t read it: their idea is that courage is indifference to others’ dislike of you, and freedom is freedom from fear of that dislike.
That kind of freedom sounds to me like “necessity” (a conventional “opposite” of freedom) as in “necessary for mental health.” At most, as the phrasing “freedom from” suggests, its a “negative liberty” or personal freedom.
So, I brought up Arendt–though I realize now that comment reads like a non-sequitur–because that she’s a (neo-republican) theorist of “positive liberty” or public freedom, that is, what I usually mean by “freedom.” Her understanding of courage, too, is public or positive.
Sorry for the long comment, but hopefully it’s clear(er) now.
I am not sure there is an absolute duty toward the social good. There is a duty, but how it manifests as activity I am not sure is assessable within a pure ethics. Social activism is always, at best compromsised in an assertion of what the proper freedom is, what actions are ethically “towards freedom”. I have difficulty in being the judge of what people are able to do. As though the lure standard of courage is in what does socially. If I stand for one good, I enact a 1000 evils. So I am not able to make that choice; the courage to stand for that one good is little better than to say that I am human and thus ethically impure at all times, that is, as though (a) God is there to judge me. The courage I have in that regard is thus actually, truly, doing the only thing I am able, at that, an act which is ultimately good and absolutely free, where no judgment can touch me. Where there is no judgement. No decision; the decision lay in the basic act. The thought about it ultimately determined in the act of itself. Choice is thus something i justify myself with more for the sake of society, and less the other way around.
Whoa. Like. Freedom is actually the courage that has nothing to be with being in agreement or disagreement.
I go with Hannah Arendt on this question. It is the courage to appear in public/engage in struggle that is most relevant to freedom.
Oh. Yeah; I’m not so into Arendt. Can’t say I’ve read her much though. But what i have. I has always sounded very “one sided” philosophically.
I thought you were saying something like that freedom is the removal of the idea that courage involves what one chooses so far as not being liked. Like the risk of not being liked is itself a move of creating discord which is itself based in a false ideal of what freedom is.
For once we step out of the causal regression of agency, then I am merely doing Becuase my actions are aligned with what is good. How ever it appears.
I think you’ve understood the original post, though I’m a bit unclear the meaning of your third paragraph. To clarify: my original post is a comment on Kishima & Koga’s Adlerian self-help book. If you haven’t read it: their idea is that courage is indifference to others’ dislike of you, and freedom is freedom from fear of that dislike.
That kind of freedom sounds to me like “necessity” (a conventional “opposite” of freedom) as in “necessary for mental health.” At most, as the phrasing “freedom from” suggests, its a “negative liberty” or personal freedom.
So, I brought up Arendt–though I realize now that comment reads like a non-sequitur–because that she’s a (neo-republican) theorist of “positive liberty” or public freedom, that is, what I usually mean by “freedom.” Her understanding of courage, too, is public or positive.
Sorry for the long comment, but hopefully it’s clear(er) now.
I didn’t know of those authors, yes Btw.
I am not sure there is an absolute duty toward the social good. There is a duty, but how it manifests as activity I am not sure is assessable within a pure ethics. Social activism is always, at best compromsised in an assertion of what the proper freedom is, what actions are ethically “towards freedom”. I have difficulty in being the judge of what people are able to do. As though the lure standard of courage is in what does socially. If I stand for one good, I enact a 1000 evils. So I am not able to make that choice; the courage to stand for that one good is little better than to say that I am human and thus ethically impure at all times, that is, as though (a) God is there to judge me. The courage I have in that regard is thus actually, truly, doing the only thing I am able, at that, an act which is ultimately good and absolutely free, where no judgment can touch me. Where there is no judgement. No decision; the decision lay in the basic act. The thought about it ultimately determined in the act of itself. Choice is thus something i justify myself with more for the sake of society, and less the other way around.